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THE DISTRIBUTION OF TALENT ACROSS CONTESTS*
Ghazala Azmat and Marc M€oller
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do
contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining
contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high-ability contestants is small.
As this proportion increases, high-ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting
decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel
data set containing contest choice over 20 years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of
highly able competitors to provide evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition and
sorting.
Competition is a defining feature of most economic and social environments.
Contestants of differing ability compete for valuable but limited resources by exerting
effort. In many cases, contestants choose from a variety of potential contests. For
example, architects choose design competitions; pharmaceutical companies select
R&D contests; athletes pick sports tournaments; and college graduates apply for
positions in firms. In these settings, contests typically differ in the way in which
(relative) performance is rewarded.
Rewarding contestants according to their relative performance is motivated by two
objectives: the provision of incentives to exert effort and the attraction of the most able
participants. Lazear and Rosen (1981) were the first to consider rank-order tourna-
ments as a way to provide incentives. Since then, a large theoretical literature has been
developed, determining the optimal design of such tournaments.1 A common theme
in this literature is that contestants exert greater efforts when prizes are larger and
more concentrated towards the highest ranks.2 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990),
using data on golf contests, and Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001), studying
labour tournaments, have provided empirical evidence for these incentive effects.
While the relationship between prizes and effort seems to be well understood,
comparatively little is known about their influence on contest selection.3 For other
incentive schemes, which use absolute rather than relative performance evaluation,
selection effects have been found to be as important as incentive effects. Lazear (2000)
documents a 44% increase in productivity for a firm switching from salaries to piece
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rates and attributes half of this increase to selection effects. High-ability workers find
firms offering piece rates more attractive than firms offering salaries. In the context of
tournaments, it remains an open question whether selection effects play a similarly
important role.
Contest selection is complicated by its multi-dimensional and interdependent
nature. Contests may differ, not only in the size, but also the number of their prizes,
making prize concentration and its effect on competition an important consideration
for contest choice. Moreover, a contestant’s set of opponents is endogenously
determined through his rivals’ participation decisions, creating the possibility of
multiple equilibria. Existing models of contest choice have either assumed that each
contest awards a single prize (Leuven et al., 2010) or that all contestants are
homogeneous (Azmat and M€oller, 2009; Konrad and Kovenock, 2012). In this article,
we relax both of these assumptions by proposing a simple, illustrative model of
contest selection with multiple prizes and heterogeneous contestants, featuring a
unique equilibrium. We show that the contests with the largest prizes attract the
highest number of talented contestants only when talent is relatively scarce. In
contrast, when talent exists in abundance, the contests with the least concentrated
prize allocation become most attractive. To the best of our knowledge, our model is
the first to provide this tight link between the distributions of prizes and talent within
and across contests.
In our setting, two types of contestants (high and low-ability), choose between two
types of contests (high and low-type). High-ability contestants have lower (constant)
marginal costs of effort than low-ability contestants. Contests differ in their prize
structure. High-type contests are characterised by high prizes and high prize
concentration, whereas low-type contests are characterised by low prizes and low prize
concentration. More specifically, high-type contests offer a small number of large
prizes, whereas low-type contests offer a large number of small prizes. We show that the
probability with which a high-ability contestant participates in a high-type, rather than
a low-type, contest is decreasing in the overall proportion of high-ability contestants.
When high-ability contestants become sufficiently numerous, sorting is reversed, that
is, high-ability contestants are more likely to enter low-type contests than high-type
contests.
At first glance, the possibility of reverse sorting seems counterintuitive since, in this
case, contestants are attracted by contests with smaller prizes and stronger opponents.
The intuition is that low-type contests become more attractive since they mitigate
competition by spreading out their prize budget. As a consequence, the contestants’
effort costs are lower in low-type contests than in high-type contests. The interaction
between effort choices and contest selection underlines the importance of incorpo-
rating both elements into models of tournament theory.
Empirically testing for selection effects is often difficult, if not impossible. In a
labour-market setting, for example, it is difficult to establish firm and worker types and,
quite often, measuring individual performance is complicated or confounded by a
number of factors. It is also difficult to obtain information about the full range of
workers’ outside options, as well as their counterfactual earnings. Moreover, an
exogenous shock to the pool of talent, allowing for the study of its effects on sorting,
rarely exists.
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
2 T H E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
In this article, we take advantage of an unusually clean opportunity to investigate the
extent of sorting across contests in a sports setting. Using extensive panel data, we
examine the contest choices of professional marathon runners. Our setup contains all
the relevant ingredients needed to test the predictions of our model. Individual
performance is readily available, together with complete information on contest and
runner characteristics. This allows us to abstract from a number of identification
problems present in other types of data.
There are two important features that make marathons the ideal setting in which to
study contest choice. First, five major marathons (Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London
and New York) have a special status comparable to the grand slam tournaments in
tennis. They offer much higher prizes than other marathons and, on average, allocate a
considerably greater proportion of their prize money to the winner. This allows us to
identify a runner’s decision between competing in a major or a minor marathon, as a
choice between high-type and low-type contests. Second, highly talented East African
runners, mainly from Kenya and Ethiopia, dominate the sport of marathon running.
This dominance is striking and unparalleled in other sports. For example, according to
the International Association of Athletics Federations’ (IAAF) Top List, the 50 fastest
male marathon runners in 2012 were exclusively from Kenya or Ethiopia. This endows
us with a proxy of the contestants’ abilities (runners’ origin), which, unlike
performance measures (finishing times), is independent of effort and prize consid-
erations. More importantly, it allows us to use exogenous variation in local economic
conditions to predict the participation of high-ability runners (Br€uckner and Ciccone,
2011).
We find that the likelihood that a high-ability runner will participate in a given
marathon is increasing in the race’s prize budget but decreasing in the expected
number of high-ability opponents. The participation of one additional high-ability
opponent must be compensated by a $2,583 increase in the contest’s average prize to
keep the race equally attractive to high-ability runners. In line with our model, we find
that the concentration of a race’s prize structure has a positive effect on participation
when opposition is expected to be weak but has a negative effect when opposition is
expected to be strong. This is important since it establishes that selection and incentive
effects are either aligned or opposed, depending on the overall competitiveness of the
environment.
Our article uses a simple theoretical framework to illustrate that complete sorting
exists in tournaments only when the proportion of high-ability participants is
sufficiently small.4 Our empirical findings constitute first evidence for tournament
selection effects in a real setting.5 In line with our main theoretical result, we find that,
when the overall ability distribution shifts upwards, potential participants become
more likely to avoid competition. In particular, when the proportion of talented
4 From a theoretical perspective, assortative matching in the labour market has been extensively studied in
non-tournament settings (Shimer and Smith, 2000; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011).
5 Sorting has been the focus of several recent empirical studies in settings such as the labour market
(Bagger and Lentz, 2014; Lise et al., 2016; Lopes de Melo, forthcoming) or school choice (Urquiola, 2005).
Experimental studies have also considered sorting across single-prize tournaments (Leuven et al., 2011) and
the choice between tournaments and alternative incentive schemes (Eriksson et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk,
2011).
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
D I S T R I B U T I O N O F T A L E N T A C RO S S CON T E S T S 3
contestants increases by 10%, the likelihood with which any one of them participates in
a major rather than a minor race falls by around 7%. These results suggest that,
depending on the ability distribution and prize structure, contestants avoid one
another to the extent that reverse sorting becomes a possibility.
Our results have the following implications for contest design: when contest choice
is endogenous, selection effects cannot be neglected and the optimal prize allocation
depends crucially on the distribution of abilities among potential contestants. This
holds true, regardless of whether the objective is to maximise aggregate output or the
winner’s performance since prizes affect both the quality of the field and the incentives
to exert effort. More importantly, selection effects can be diametrically opposed to
incentive effects, and the positive influence of concentrated prize allocations on efforts
may be more than compensated by their negative influence on the self-selection of
talented contestants.
1. Theoretical Framework
We present a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the effect of changes in the
ability distribution on the level of sorting across contests. The model demonstrates that
the provision of strong incentives increases participation of talented contestants but
that talent crowds out talent. The model makes precise how these two factors interact,
resulting, first, in a negative relation between the frequency of high abilities and the
level of sorting and, second, in the possible existence of reverse sorting.
1.1. Model
We assume a continuum of contests and a continuum of risk-neutral players.6 Contests
allow for the same number N + 1 of participants. The integer N indicates a player’s
number of opponents. We let N ≥ 2 to guarantee that in each contest the number of
players is larger than the number of prizes. In order to balance the number of players
with the number of available contest slots, we assume that there exists a mass 1 of
players and a mass 1/(N + 1) of contests.
There are two types of contests, high-type contests and low-type contests. A contest of
type j 2 {l, h} offers Mj 2 f1; 2; . . . ; N g prizes, identical in size, bj [ 0:7 High-type
contests award fewer (Mh\Ml) but larger (bh [ bl) prizes than low-type contests.8 In
6 In such a setting, with many contests and a large number of players, a single player’s action has no effect
on the optimal contest choice of the remaining players. This rules out coordination issues, dominant in
settings with a small number of contests and players (Amegashie and Wu, 2004), and guarantees the
uniqueness of equilibrium. The implications of risk aversion are discussed at the end of the Section.
7 The assumption that, within a given contest, all prizes are identical makes the model tractable. A general
description of competition for the case of heterogeneous players and non-identical prizes is still missing.
Bulow and Levin (2006), Cohen and Sela (2008), Olszewsky and Siegel (2016) and Xiao (2016) are first steps
in this direction. We discuss the effect of skewed prize distributions on contest choice after stating our main
theoretical result.
8 This assumption makes contest choice non-trivial. If, instead, one type of contest offered fewer and
smaller prizes, then, neglecting potential differences in opposition, all contestants would prefer the other
type of contest. In a labour tournament setting, Yun (1997) shows that first-best efforts and efficient self-
selection can be achieved when workers are offered the choice between a tournament with many large prizes
and a tournament with few small prizes.
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other words, high-type contests are characterised by high prizes and high prize
concentration, whereas low-type contests are characterised by low prizes and low prize
concentration. Note that we do not make any restrictions with respect to the
comparison of the contests’ overall prize budgets. However, for the purpose of the
subsequent comparative statics analysis, we define an increase in a prize structure’s
concentration to be an increase in bj accompanied by a decrease in Mj ; keeping the
overall prize budget Mjbj unchanged. Apart from the differences in their prize
structures, high-type and low-type contests are assumed to be identical. For simplicity,
we assume that both types exist in equal proportions.9
There are two types of players, low-ability players and high-ability players, i 2 {L, H}.
A high-ability player’s (constant) marginal cost of effort, cH [ 0; is strictly smaller than
a low-ability player’s marginal cost, cL [ cH : To abbreviate notation, we define
c  ðcH=cLÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ: The crucial parameter of the model is the proportion of high-
ability players, denoted by y. We focus on the case in which high-ability players are in
the minority, y 2 (0, 1/2). This assumption guarantees that, if they desire, all high-
ability players can enter a high-type contest.
The model has two stages. In the first stage, players choose (simultaneously) which
(type of) contest to enter and, in the second stage, they compete by exerting effort
(simultaneously).10 At the entry stage, players form expectations about their
opponents’ abilities based on their knowledge of the overall distribution of types
and the equilibrium strategies. At the competition stage, players observe their
opponents’ abilities and, given the contest’s prize structure, then simultaneously make
their effort choices.11
We model competition as a perfectly discriminating contest, where prizes are
awarded to the players who exert the highest levels of effort (and ties are broken
randomly).12 This follows an extensive literature on contest design (Clark and Riis,
1998; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001, 2006). In terms of payoffs, a player of type i who
exerts effort e ≥ 0 in a contest of type j will receive utility U ji ¼ bj  cie if he wins one
of the Mj prizes and U
j
i ¼  cie otherwise.
Since, at the competition stage, players can guarantee themselves a payoff of zero by
exerting no effort, and players are assumed to have a zero outside option, at the entry
stage, no player will choose not to participate in any contest at all.13 This means that if a
9 We have verified that our results remain qualitatively unchanged when this assumption is relaxed. The
corresponding comparative statics are discussed at the end of this Section.
10 If players chose contests sequentially and could observe who entered previously, they would have an
even stronger incentive to avoid contests with strong opponents. Hence, our assumption of simultaneous
entry is the most conservative with respect to the possibility of reverse sorting.
11 Abstracting from effort choices and instead assuming that performance is determined by a player’s
ability plus noise would neglect the fact that low-type contests might be attractive due to their mitigating
effect on competition.
12 Alternatively, competition could have a stochastic element – i.e. winning could depend on efforts and
random factors. For a discussion of this case, see footnote 16.
13 We assume that players participate when indifferent between participation and non-participation. We
show that low-ability players expect a zero payoff from participation since their expected prize winnings are
compensated exactly by their effort costs. A zero outside option, thus, means that, apart from prizes,
participation must offer alternative sources of utility that are independent of the choice of contest and offset
the potential benefits from non-participation. Adding a performance-independent payment (wage,
attendance pay) to the contests’ payoff structure has no effect on our results.
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fraction qi 2 ½0; 1 of type i players enters high-type contests, then the remaining
fraction 1  qi will enter low-type contests. The players’ behaviour at the entry stage
can, therefore, be completely described by the fractions of low-ability (qL) and high-
ability (qH ) players that enter high-type contests.
14
The distribution of players across contests can be characterised as exhibiting:
complete sorting when all high-ability players enter high prize contests, qH ¼ 1; partial
sorting when a larger number of high-ability players enter high-type contests than low-
type contests, qH [ 1=2; and reverse sorting when the opposite is the case, qH \ 1=2:
An equilibrium distribution of talent ðqH ; qLÞ has to satisfy two conditions: an
optimality condition and a feasibility condition. The optimality conditions requires
that no player be able to increase his payoff by entering another (type of) contest. This
means that if players of the same type i enter both types of contests, qi 2 ð0; 1Þ; then
these players must expect equal payoffs. In addition, if all players of type i enter the
same type of contest, i.e. qi 2 f0; 1g, then their expected payoff must not be higher in
the other type of contest. The feasibility condition requires that the number of players
who participate in a given type of contest must equal the number of available slots in
contests of this type:
yqH þ ð1 yÞqL ¼ yð1 qH Þ þ ð1 yÞð1 qLÞ ¼ 1
2
: (1)
The novelty of the model outlined above is that it allows for the study of contest
selection in a setting with multiple prizes as well as heterogeneous contestants. While
heterogeneity is a pre-requisite for the study of sorting, allowing for multiple prizes is
important since the choice between a more competitive environment (with few prizes)
and a less competitive environment (with many prizes) constitutes one of the key
dimensions of the contest choice problem. In previous work, Azmat and M€oller (2009)
and Konrad and Kovenock (2012) consider a group of homogeneous contestants
choosing between contests with differing prize structures. Due to the absence of ability
differences, sorting could not be analysed in these models. In a setting with two single-
prize contests of varying size, Leuven et al. (2010) study sorting by allowing for two
types of contestants. They share our finding that reverse sorting is a possibility but
reverse sorting arises for a different reason and often in conjunction with positive
sorting (multiple equilibria). In their setting, reverse sorting can be an equilibrium
only if by deviating to the low prize contest high-ability contestants would encounter a
higher number of opponents. In our setting, reverse sorting arises even when
contestants face the same number of opponents in each contest and is due to the
mitigating effect of low prize concentrations on competition.
Our analysis proceeds by backward induction and consists of two steps. In subsection
1.2, drawing on a recent result by Siegel (2009), we characterise a player’s expected
payoff from participating in a contest with a given set of opponents. The main result
necessary for the subsequent analysis, which is the focus of our study, is that a player’s
expected payoff is positive (and equal to bjð1  cÞ) if and only if the player has high
ability and the number of high-ability opponents is strictly smaller than the number of
14 Alternatively, qi can be interpreted as the probability with which a player of type i enters a high-type
contest. Since we consider a continuum of players, both interpretations are equivalent.
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prizes Mj . In subsection 1.3, we use these payoffs to derive our main theoretical results
on the players’ individual contest choice and the equilibrium distribution of talent
across contests. All proofs are given in Appendix A.
1.2. Competition
In this Section, we derive a player’s expected payoff at the competition stage, that
is, for a given set of prizes and opponents. In making their effort choice, players
trade off a higher chance of winning against an increase in their costs of effort. The
characterisation of equilibrium effort strategies has proven difficult in general, even
for the case in which all prizes are identical (Baye et al., 1996; Clark and Riis, 1998;
Barut and Kovenock, 1998). Players use mixed strategies due to the all–pay auction
character of competition. Because of the potential presence of identical players,
multiple equilibria may exist. These equilibria differ with respect to the set of
players who are active, that is, who provide effort with positive probability. In
equilibrium, all active players win a prize with positive probability. More able players
are more likely to win a prize since they exert higher efforts in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance.
Siegel (2009) shows that for a large class of ‘generic contests’, all equilibria are
payoff-equivalent. More specifically, the players’ expected payoffs depend on their
abilities and the contest’s prize structure but not on the particular equilibrium that is
played. In our setting, a contest with Mj prizes is generic if the player with theMj þ 1’s
lowest marginal cost of effort has marginal costs that are different from any other
player’s. In what follows, we use a perturbation argument that allows us to employ
Siegel’s results.
For this purpose, suppose that there exist arbitrarily small differences in the
marginal costs of effort for players of the same type i 2 {L, H}.15 Under this additional
assumption, the main result of Siegel (2009) implies that, in a contest with Mj prizes, a
player’s expected payoff, in any equilibrium, is given by max½0; bjð1  cÞ; where c
denotes the ratio of the player’s marginal cost over the Mj þ 1’s lowest marginal cost
of all players in the contest. Therefore, by taking the limit, we get the following:
LEMMA 1. Suppose that NH 2 f0; 1; . . . ; N þ 1g high-ability players and N þ 1  NH
low-ability players participate in a contest offering Mj prizes of size bj . A player’s expected payoff is
bjð1  cÞ if the player has high ability and the number of high-ability opponents is strictly smaller
than the number of prizes. Otherwise, his payoff is zero.
Note that for low-ability players, (expected) prize winnings are exactly offset by the
(expected) costs of effort.16 High-ability players enjoy a comparative advantage due to
15 The argument is made precise in the proof of Lemma 1 contained in Appendix A.
16 This is a consequence of contests being perfectly discriminating. If contests involved a random element,
then the expected payoffs of low-ability players would depend on prizes, but this dependence would still be
weaker than it is for high-ability players. Since sorting can be expected to be strongest when ability matters
most, the absence of randomness is the most conservative assumption with respect to our finding that sorting
may be reversed. For a detailed study of the relationship between a contest’s prize structure and its
randomness, see Azmat and M€oller (2009).
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their lower marginal cost of effort and, therefore, obtain a positive payoff. This
comparative advantage disappears when the number of high-ability players, NH ,
exceeds the number of prizes, Mj . In this case, all players expect a zero payoff,
independent of their ability.
1.3. Contest Choice
In this subsection, we first consider how a player’s preferences over contests depend on
the contests’ prize structure and the expected opposition. In a second step, we
determine the equilibrium allocation of talent across contests.
1.3.1. Individual preferences
The analysis in the previous subsection showed that low-ability players expect the same
(zero) payoff, independent of the type of contest they enter. Hence, low-ability players
are indifferent between the two types of contests and we can concentrate our analysis
on the preferences of high-ability players. The expected payoff of a high-ability player
does depend on the specific features of the contest he enters. In the preceding
Section, we demonstrated that in a contest offering Mj prizes of size bj , a high-ability
player expects a positive payoff equal to bjð1  cÞ if the number of high-ability
opponents is smaller than Mj and a zero payoff otherwise.
At the time of entry, the number of high-ability opponents in a particular type of
contest is uncertain. Hence, from the viewpoint of the entry stage, the player’s
preferences will depend on the likelihood pj with which an opponent has high ability.
According to Lemma 1, the probability with which a high-ability player obtains a
positive payoff is identical to the probability with which at most Mj  1 of his N
opponents have high ability. It is given by F ðMj  1; N ; pjÞ with F denoting the
cumulative binomial distribution function:
F ðK ;N ; pÞ 
XK
k¼0
f ðk;N ; pÞ 
XK
k¼0
N
k
 
pkð1 pÞNk ; (2)
measuring the likelihood of observing at most K ‘successes’ within N independent
binomial draws with success-probability p. A high-ability player’s expected payoff from
entering the contest is:
EðUH Þ ¼ bjð1 cÞF ðMj  1;N ; pjÞ: (3)
It depends on the contest’s prize structure, represented by Mj and bj , and the expected
opposition, given by the likelihood pj of meeting high rather than low-ability
opponents. Note that, at this stage, the variable pj is treated as exogenous. The
determination of its equilibrium value follows below. In Appendix A, we prove the
following result:
PROPOSITION 1. A high-ability player’s expected payoff from entering a contest is increasing
in the size bj of its prizes but decreasing in the probability pj with which opponents have high
ability. Payoffs are increasing in the concentration of the contest’s prize structure when opposition
is weak (pj\ pj ) but decreasing when opposition is strong (pj [ pj ).
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The first part of Proposition 1 is intuitive and follows easily from (2) and (3). The
last part of Proposition 1 considers the effect of a decrease in the number of prizes,
accompanied by an increase in the size of the prize. As can be seen from the proof
contained in Appendix A, the particular value taken by the threshold pj depends on
the specific changes in Mj and bj . Intuitively, when the probability of meeting high-
ability opponents is small, high-ability players prefer a more concentrated prize
structure due to their comparative advantage over low-ability players. In contrast, when
the probability of meeting high-ability opponents is large, high-ability players prefer a
less concentrated prize structure due to its mitigating effect on competition and the
resulting decrease in effort costs.
To summarise, while prizes are predicted to have a positive effect on a player’s
decision to enter a particular contest, the effect of (expected) opposition is negative.
Moreover, opposition has not only a level effect but also an interactive effect with the
concentration of the contest’s prize structure.
1.3.2. Sorting
Having described the players’ individual preferences, we now determine their
equilibrium allocation across the two types of contests. Our analysis proceeds as
follows. For a given allocation ðqH ; qLÞ; we determine the likelihood pj of meeting high-
ability opponents in a contest of type j 2 {l, h}, which allows us to calculate the players’
expected payoffs in both types of contest. We then verify whether the optimality and
feasibility conditions outlined above are satisfied. The indifference of low-ability
players implies that optimality needs to be checked only for high-ability players and
that feasibility is guaranteed by the low-ability players’ willingness to fill any slot that has
remained idle.
For a given allocation ðqH ; qLÞ, the number of high-ability players who choose a high-
type contest is given by yqH . Since there are 1/(N + 1) contests and both types of
contests exist in equal proportion, there are 1/[2(N + 1)] high-type contests, each
offering N + 1 slots. The likelihood with which a slot in a high-type contest is filled with
a high-ability opponent can be calculated by dividing the number of high-ability players
who choose a high-type contest, yqH , by the overall number of slots available in the
high-type contests, 1/2. It is given by ph ¼ 2yqH . Similarly, the likelihood with which a
slot in a low-type contest is filled by a high-ability opponent is given by
pl ¼ 2yð1  qH Þ.
To check optimality for high-ability players, we need to consider the difference
between their expected payoffs from entering a high-type versus a low-type contest.
From (3) this difference is proportional to:
D  bhF ðMh  1;N ; phÞ  bl F ðMl  1;N ; plÞ: (4)
High-ability players strictly prefer a high-type (low-type) contest when D > 0
(D < 0) and are indifferent when D = 0. In Appendix A, we prove the following
result:
PROPOSITION 2. There exists a unique equilibrium allocation ðqH ; qLÞ of abilities that
depends on the proportion y of high abilities in the population of players. In particular, there exist
critical values y 2 ð0; 1=2Þ and y 2 ðy; 1=2 such that the following hold:
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(i) For y  y, sorting is complete, qH ¼ 1. All high-ability players enter high-type contests.
(ii) For y\ y\y, sorting is only partial, qH 2 ð1=2; 1Þ. High-type contests attract a
greater number of high-ability players than low-type contests.Moreover, talent crowds out
talent, i.e. qH is strictly decreasing in y.
(iii) For y  y, sorting is reversed, qH  1=2. Low-type contests attract a greater number of
high-ability players than high-type contests.
An increase in the high-type contests’ prize budget Mhbh relative to the low-type contests’ prize
budget Mlbl leads to a higher level of sorting by increasing q

H and y.
The intuition for this result is as follows. High-type contests offer high prizes, while
low-type contests mitigate competition by spreading out their prize budget. From the
viewpoint of a high-ability player, effort considerations become more important as the
likelihood of meeting high-ability rivals increases and his comparative advantage over
low-ability players plays a smaller role. When high abilities become sufficiently
frequent, the mitigation of competition outweighs all else, such that high-ability players
prefer low-type contests over high-type contests, even though prizes are smaller and
rivals are more able in the former than in the latter. This contrasts with the common
intuition that, in equilibrium, contest choices should be driven by a trade-off between
high prizes and strong opposition, versus low prizes and weak opposition. The
possibility of reverse sorting, therefore, emphasises the need for including effort
considerations in models of contest choice.
For the general case, we cannot rule out that y ¼ 1=2. To show that within our range
of parameters y 2 (0, 1/2), reverse sorting is indeed a possibility, we provide an
example in which y is strictly smaller than 1/2.
Example: Reverse sorting between one-prize and two-prize contests. Consider the special case
in which both types of contests have the same total prize budget B. Let high-type
contests award their entire budget to the player with the highest effort, i.e.Mh ¼ 1 and
bh ¼ B. Let low-type contests offer two identical prizes instead, i.e. Ml ¼ 2 and
bl ¼ B=2. In the proof of Proposition 2, we show for the general case that D is strictly
decreasing in qH . This is intuitive since an increase in qH raises the expected opposition
in a high-type contest while lowering the expected opposition in a low-type contest.
Hence, y\ 1=2 if and only if DðqH ¼ 1=2Þ\ 0 for some y < 1/2. For the special case
under consideration, substitution of Mj and bj into (4) leads to:
D

q ¼ 1
2

¼ B
2
½1 yÞN1ð1 ðN þ 1Þy: (5)
This shows that reverse sorting between one-prize and two-prize contests of identical
budgets exists when y > 1/(N + 1). For example, when contests allow for 20
participants, then sorting would already be reversed when more than 5% of the
players in the population of potential participants have high-ability.
We expect that our results will hold quite generally. In our model, the main driver of
the results is that low prize concentration mitigates competition, leading to a reduction
in effort costs. This element of the model is not unique to our setting. Indeed, it has
been established that low prize concentration (in the form of multiple rather than
single prizes) can lead to an increase in (aggregate) efforts only in exceptional cases,
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for example, when effort costs are sufficiently convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), or
when the number of contestants is small and contestants are sufficiently risk averse
(Krishna and Morgan, 1998) or heterogeneous (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). It is
therefore likely that Proposition 2 will hold in alternative contest setups.
Proposition 2 is also robust with respect to other features of our setup. First, it
remains valid when players are risk averse rather than risk neutral. To see this, note
that from the viewpoint of a high-ability player, each contest can be understood as a
lottery with two possible outcomes. A high payoff is obtained when the number of high-
ability participants fails to exceed the number of prizes and a low payoff is obtained
otherwise. For qH [ 1=2, the high payoff, though smaller, is more likely to be obtained
in low-type contests than in high-type contests. Hence, low-type contests constitute the
less-risky lottery. Risk aversion gives high-ability players an additional incentive to
choose a low-type rather than a high-type contest.17 Therefore, we consider our
assumption of risk neutrality as the most conservative with respect to the possibility of
reverse sorting.18
Second, consider the effect of relaxing our assumption that both types of contests
exist in equal proportions. Suppose, for example, that there exists a larger number of
high-type than low-type contests. In this case, the likelihood of meeting a high-ability
opponent in a high-type contest is lower than 2yqH , and the likelihood of meeting a
high-ability player in a low-type contest is higher than 2yð1  qH Þ, for any given value
of qH . This makes high-type contests more attractive relative to low-type contests,
leading to a (weak) upward shift in the equilibrium value of qH . The thresholds y and y
shift to the right. The results in Proposition 2 change quantitatively but remain
qualitatively unchanged.
Finally, suppose that contests offer decreasing rather than identical prizes. If high-
type contests offer a steeper prize allocation than low-type contests then contest-types
differ in the same way as before, although differences are less pronounced. In
particular, contests with steeper prize allocations offer higher prizes to top-performers
while contests with flatter prize allocations can be expected to mitigate competition.19
We therefore believe that our results would extend to settings with heterogeneous
prizes.
1.3.3. Coordination
Our model can be used to shed light on the influence of coordination on the
allocation of talent across contests. For this purpose, assume that, rather than being
non-cooperative, the contest choice of all high-ability contestants is the task of a
common coordinator.20 The coordinator influences the allocation of high-ability
17 This is in line with Dohmen and Falk’s (2011) experimental finding that subjects who choose a
tournament rather than a fixed payment have a lower degree of risk aversion.
18 Note that this discussion ignores that risk aversion may also influence the way in which players compete.
It has been shown, for example, that risk aversion decreases the effort of low-ability contestants but increases
the effort of high-ability contestants in single-prize contests (Fibich et al., 2006).
19 Although this seems reasonable, confirming it would require a model of competition with
heterogeneous players and heterogeneous prizes.
20 Assuming full coordination allows us to consider sorting in a setting which is diametrically opposed to
our benchmark case of non-cooperative contest choice. We expect all partially coordinated outcomes to lie in
between these two polar cases.
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contestants by choosing the fraction qH 2 ½0; 1 entering high-type contests.21 The
coordinator’s objective is to maximise the sum of all high-ability contestants’
(expected) payoffs:
E
X
UH
 
¼ ð1 cÞ qH bhF ðMh  1;N ; phÞ þ ð1 qH ÞblF ðMl  1;N ; plÞ½ : (6)
The coordinated solution qCH must satisfy the first order condition:
DC ¼ Dþ 2yð1 cÞ qH bh @F ðMh  1;N ; phÞ
@p
 ð1 qH Þbl @F ðMl  1;N ; plÞ
@p
 
 0: (7)
Here D denotes the term defined in (43), determining the non-cooperative
equilibrium qH . The term in square brackets measures the externalities of a high-
ability contestant’s contest choice on all other high-ability contestants. Since F is
decreasing in p, a contestant’s switch from low-type to high-type contests, decreases
the payoff of the qH contestants in high-type contests by ð1  cÞbh while increasing
the payoff of the 1  qH contestants in low-type contests by ð1  cÞbl . The difference
between the coordinated and the non-cooperative solution is that the coordinator
internalises these externalities whereas they are neglected when contestants choose
individually.
The internalisation of contest-choice externalities may prevent the coordinator’s
objective function from being concave, thereby complicating the characterisation of
the coordinated solution qCH along the lines of Proposition 2. However, the
coordinator’s objective is, in fact, concave when the number of high-ability contestants
is sufficiently low, which is when coordination is most likely to play a role. This allows us
to obtain the following:
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that y\Mh=2N . If (non-cooperative) sorting is positive,
coordination decreases the fraction of high-talent players participating in high-type contests, i.e.
qH  1=2 ) qCH  qH with strict inequality for qH \ 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the coordinated solution qCH serves as a lower bound for the
non-cooperative equilibrium qH .
22 This is intuitive since, due to the externalities
described above, the coordinator has an incentive to spread high-ability players across
contests. Moreover, even with coordination, the two major forces – high prizes versus
low effort costs – determining contest choice in the non-cooperative setting are still
present. We therefore expect the coordinated solution to share the properties of the
non-cooperative equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2. In particular, the negative
dependence of sorting on the number of high-ability contestants should continue to
exist in the presence of coordination.23
21 While contest-type choices are coordinated, we continue to assume that, within each type, contests are
picked randomly and, once contestants have entered a certain contest, they choose their efforts non-
cooperatively.
22 Since qH \ 1 , bhF ðMh  1; 2yÞ\ bl (see proof of Proposition 2), we can always choose bl=bh such
that y\ ðMh=2N Þ, i.e. there indeed exist parameters for which qCH is strictly smaller than qH .
23 We have confirmed this numerically. Details are available on request.
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2. Empirical Framework
Our theoretical framework makes precise how a contest’s attractiveness to high-ability
runners depends on its prize structure and how the overall number of high-ability
runners influences their sorting across the two types of contests. Thus, testing the
model’s predictions requires variation in the distribution of abilities and variation in
prize structures across contests. In this Section, we test our model’s predictions using a
large panel data set of international city marathons and professional marathon
runners, which spans more than 20 years.24
Beyond the common advantages of sports data recognised in the literature, two
important factors make marathons the ideal setting to test our theory.25 First, a fairly
homogeneous group of high-ability runners can be identified by their (East African)
origin rather than by performance measures – such as finishing time – that may be
endogenous to the prize budget. Second, there are five races (Boston, Berlin, Chicago,
London and New York), which, for historical reasons, have a special status in running,
comparable to the ‘Grand Slam’ tournaments in tennis. These races offer considerably
higher and more concentrated prizes than others.
The dominance of East African marathon runners is most striking. In 2009, for
example, 88 of the 100 fastest (male) marathon runners were from either Kenya or
Ethiopia.26 This dominance, unparalleled in other sports, has been explained by
genetic, social, nutritional and geographical factors (Finn, 2012). It allows us to
overcome the usual identification problem of measuring ability using past perfor-
mance, which, unlike origin, may depend on prize and effort considerations. Another
advantage is that this group of high-ability runners is fairly homogeneous, as postulated
by our model, and exhibits a good deal of variation in marathon participation, thereby
enabling our analysis of sorting. The dominance of East African runners became
apparent in the 1970s, when a handful of East African runners participated in
international marathons, winning by great margins. Their success sparked a profes-
sional running culture in their home countries making marathon running a way to
escape poverty. Certain minimum standards, however, must be met to make travel
abroad worthwhile and, as a consequence, the participation of East Africans in
international races is still restricted to the most talented.27 Marathon running,
in general, has become more competitive (see Figure 1). While in the early 1980s, the
fastest runners had a comparative advantage of around 6% (eight minutes), this
advantage had decreased to less than 2% (two minutes) by the late 2000s. This change
in the ability distribution constitutes a crucial element of our analysis of sorting.
24 We are not the first to use sports data to test the predictions of contest theory, although this literature
has focused mainly on incentive effects; see Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Brown (2011) on golf;
Becker and Huselid (1992) on auto racing; and Lynch and Zax (2000) on running.
25 Sports contests share many features with other contests, such as those seen in a labour-market setting.
However, unlike in labour tournaments, prizes and performance are easily observed. It is often difficult, if not
impossible, to know the pay structure within firms. Moreover, workers’ individual performance is seldom
observed; nor are there well-defined measures that are recognised across firms, even for those in the same
industry or sector.
26 See top list of the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) available online at https://
www.iaaf.org/records/toplists/roadrunning/marathon/outdoor/men/senior/2009.
27 As a robustness check, we compare performance in years with a greater presence of East African runners
to years in which there are fewer. The quality of performance is not affected. See subsection 2.4.
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Regarding contests, our model postulates the existence of two types that differ with
respect to their prize structure. In the world of running, a clear distinction can be
made between the races in Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London and New York and the
remaining races. These five marathons have the longest history and attract the
highest number of runners. Their special status has manifested itself in the creation
of the World Marathon Majors series in 2006.28 In the following we therefore refer to
these races as ‘major’ marathons and denote all remaining races as ‘minor’
marathons. Most importantly, the major marathons award much higher prizes and
offer considerably more-concentrated prize allocations than other marathons. These
features allows us to identify the World Marathon Majors as the high-type contests of
our theoretical model.
Apart from the dominance of East African runners and the special status of the
major marathons, a number of other features of professional marathons make them an
appropriate setting for testing the theoretical model. First, the model assumes that
players can participate in, at most, one contest. This is consistent with the empirical
framework. Marathons are typically clustered into two seasons: spring and autumn.
Marathon runners can run more than one race but to achieve top performance they
must allow for a considerable rest period between races. As a consequence, runners
typically choose only one race per season.29
Second, the model assumes that runners make their race choices simultaneously. In
fact, what matters for the analysis is not the precise timing of entry but that runners
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Fig. 1. Competitiveness of Marathon Running
Notes. Competitiveness is defined as the ratio of the fastest (male) winning time of a year over the
average finishing times of the top 20 (male) finishers in all races. Finishing times are adjusted for
racecourse differences.
28 Collectively, the group annually attracts more than five million on-course spectators, 250 million
television viewers and 150,000 participants. For more details, see http://worldmarathonmajors.com/US/
about/.
29 In our sample, less than 2% of runners run more than two races per year.
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face uncertainty regarding the race choice of other runners at the time of their own
entry decision. An important feature of marathon running is that runners must choose
their races several months in advance in order to achieve peak performance on race
day via the exact adjustment of their training plans. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that runners face considerable uncertainty about their prospective opponents when
making their race choices.
Third, in themodel, players are assumed tobemotivatedonly by prizemoney. To judge
the importance of other factors, such as prestige or the possibility of achieving a personal
best, empirically we perform a counterfactual analysis in subsection 2.4. In this analysis,
we show that, conditional on their effort and that of all other runners, runnersmost often
enter the race in which they maximise their monetary payoff, providing support for the
model’s focus on prizes. In this respect, it is also important to note that in comparison to
other sports, very few runners obtain the status of amarketable superstar, so prizemoney
constitutes the dominant source of income for most runners.
Finally, our restriction to two types of contests with few (identical) high prizes or
many (identical) low prizes is certainly a simplification with respect to the more
sophisticated prize structures used in marathons. Nevertheless, it provides a good
approximation of the runners’ main trade-off between a small likelihood of winning a
high prize and a large likelihood of winning a low prize.
2.1. Data Description
We use data from the Association of Road Racing Statisticians, which contains detailed
race and runner information for the largest international marathons. We restrict
attention to the 35 marathons that are present in our sample for the entire period from
1986 to 2009.30 Since a marathon’s prize budget and participation are strongly
correlated with the number of years that the race has been in existence, these races are
among the most important events in the world of road racing.
For each race, we observe the date, location and the prize distribution. At the runner
level, we identify the top (professional) finishers for each race. To maintain a balanced
panel and since we are only interested in the race choice of the most able runners,
we restrict our attention to the first 20 finishers in each race (separately by gender).
Since marathons award fewer than 20 prizes for each race, our data contain runners
who win and runners who do not win a prize. We have information on the runners’
gender, nationality, date of birth, finishing time, finishing position, and the prize
awarded (if any).31 Tables 1 and 2 provide the main descriptive statistics for races and
runners, respectively.
30 These are follows: Beijing, Berlin, Boston, California International, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Dublin,
Frankfurt, Gold Coast, Grandma’s, Hamburg, Honolulu, Houston, Italia, Kosice, London, Los Angeles,
Madrid, New York, Ottawa, Paris, Reims, Richmond, San Antonio, Rome, Seoul, Stockholm, Tokyo, Turin,
Twin Cities, Valencia, Venice, Vienna, and Warsaw. We exclude the marathons in Rotterdam, Amsterdam,
and Fukuoka since no prize-money information was available. We also exclude Dubai because it has existed
only for a few years.
31 Some marathons have faster (flatter) race courses than others, but the Association of Road Racing
Statisticians has constructed conversion factors to make marathons comparable. We adjust all the finishing
times in our data set using these conversion factors.
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
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In Table 1, we show the descriptive statistics separately for major and minor races.
Table 1 shows that the average prize in a major marathon is considerably higher than
the average prize in a minor marathon ($17,227 compared to $3,240). Moreover, we
see that major marathons award a considerably greater share of their prize budget to
the winner than minor marathons (34% compared to 27%). A comparison of the
Herfindahl concentration index based on the first three prizes reveals that 57% of the
major races have a Herfindahl index greater than the average, compared to only 35%
for minor races. Hence, in line with our theoretical framework, major marathons offer
higher but more-concentrated prize structures. Further support for the identification
of major races as high-type contests is provided in subsection 2.4.
Apart from prizes, there are other stark differences between the two race categories.
Major marathons have (overall) around three times more participants than minor
marathons (22,332 compared with 6,838). The two types of races also differ in the
quality of the runners they attract. From Table 1, we can see that, on average, overall
years, the fraction of high-ability runners has been considerably larger in the major
races. This holds whether we identify high-ability runners by origin or by (course-
adjusted) finishing times. For example, 18% of the finishers in the major races were
East African, compared to only 14% in the other races. Similarly, 29% of runners in the
major races had a finishing time within 5% of the year’s best, compared with only 8%
in the minor races. As a consequence, winning times in major races are, on average,
eight minutes faster, which is equivalent to a 2.6 km lead.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of runners. In this Table, we compare East
African runners, high-ability non-East African runners, and other non-East African
runners, respectively. High-ability non-East African runners are defined as the 100
fastest non-East African runners within their gender category, based on their fastest
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (Races)
Variables
Major races All other races
Observations Mean SD Observations Mean SD
Average prize ($) 238 17,277 9,372 1,381 3,240 4,331
1st/total 238 0.34 0.12 1,381 0.27 0.27
High concentration 238 0.57 0.5 1,381 0.35 0.48
No. of participants 236 22,332 10,143 859 6,838 6,462
Winning time (hh:min) 238 02:17 00:09 1,381 02:25 00:13
High ability (origin) 238 0.18 0.18 1,381 0.14 0.22
High ability (1%) 238 0.03 0.06 1,381 0.00 0.02
High ability (5%) 238 0.29 0.26 1,381 0.08 0.17
High ability (10%) 238 0.66 0.29 1,381 0.36 0.36
Notes. Means and standard deviations for major and minor marathons, respectively. Major races are the Berlin,
Boston, Chicago, London andNewYorkmarathons. The sample period is 1986–2009. ‘Average prize’ is the sum
of all prizes awarded in a race (USdollars at 2000prices)dividedby thenumberof prizewinners. ‘1st/total’ is the
winner’s prize divided by the sum of all prizes in a race. ‘High concentration’ takes value 1 if the Herfindahl
index, calculated for the top three prizes, is above its mean value. ‘No. of participants’ is the total number of
participants, including amateurs, in a race. These data were collected separately from various sources, including
ARRS and race websites. ‘Winning time’ is adjusted using ARRS conversion factors to ensure that times are
comparable across races. ‘High ability (origin)’ refers to the fraction of runners fromEast Africa among the first
20 finishers of a race. Similarly, ‘High ability (1%) (5%), (10%)’ refers to the fraction of runners among thefirst
20 finishers of a race, finishing within 1%, 5% and 10% of the best time of the year, respectively.
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
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finishing time for a given year.32 For male runners, we see that East African runners are
comparable to high-ability non-East African runners on a number of dimensions,
including prize money ($7,676 versus $8,284), finishing times (two hours, 14 minutes
versus two hours, 12 minutes) and the number of marathons entered in a given year
(1.42 versus 1.44). Compared with other runners, however, these two groups look very
different. For female runners, the same patterns hold. East African runners are
comparable with the best non-East African, lending support to our identification of East
African runners as high-ability contestants; but both groups are noticeably different
from other runners. The focus of the analysis will be on these high-ability runners.
2.2. Individual Contest Choice
We are now ready to test the predictions of our model. We start by considering a
runner’s individual race choice before moving to the equilibrium allocation of talent
in the subsequent Section.
To test Proposition 1, we investigate how a runner’s expected payoff from a
marathon and, hence, his probability of entering depend on the race’s characteristics.
Letting Pijt denote the probability with which runner i enters race j in time period t, we
estimate the following equation:
Pijt ¼ a0 þ aAAjt1 þ aBBjt þ aCCjt þ aAC ðAjt1  CjtÞ þ X ibþ eijt : (8)
The variable Ajt1 denotes the level of expected opposition. It is measured as the
proportion of high-ability participants among the race’s top 20 finishers in the previous
year. The variable Bjt denotes the marathon’s average prize. Cjt is a measure of the prize
structure’s concentration, calculated as the ratio of the first prize over the sum of all
prizes. We also include a vector of control variables, X i , containing the runner’s age,
nationality, gender, and ranking in the previous year. In addition, we control for
whether the race took place on the runner’s home turf since that may confer some
comparative advantage. We also control for gender-specific time dummies and race
fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the runner-year level.
According to Proposition 1, the probability with which a runner enters a race will be
increasing in the average prize, Bjt , such that aB [ 0, and decreasing in expected
opposition,Ajt1, such that aA\ 0.Moreover, we expect the effect of concentration,Cjt , on
entry to depend on the level of expected opposition. The model predicts that more-
concentrated prize structures are attractive only when there are sufficiently few opponents,
and are unattractive otherwise. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on the interaction
term ðAjt1  CjtÞ to be negative (aAC\ 0). Since Proposition 1 is concerned with the
preferencesof high-ability contestants, we restrict our attention to the race choiceof the top
runners.
As our main variable of interest (Ajt1), is based on the past race choices made by a
group of top-runners, using the race choice observations for runners from the same
group would result in a mechanical bias. This is because their races choices would
be influenced by the races’ characteristics in an identical way. We would therefore want
to separate runners into two groups with identical (high) ability but (potentially)
32 Our results are robust with respect to changes in the cut-off point for our definition of ‘high-ability’.
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different race choice preferences. We do this by restricting the participation analysis to
the high-ability non-East African runners and by using the proportion of East African
runners in a race’s previous edition as proxy for the expected opposition. We showed
in Table 2 that both groups of runners are comparable in their abilities. However, it is
likely that there exists enough independent variation in their race choices to give a
causal estimation of the effect of expected opposition on race participation. Another
advantage of using runners from East Africa is that it allows us to use exogeneous
variation in local conditions as an instrument for expected opposition.33 We deal with
this issue explicitly in the next Section.
In Table 3, we present the results without the interaction between opposition and
concentration. Columns (1) and (2) present the baseline regression without and with
controls, respectively. Column (3) includes year dummies and year dummies interacted
by gender to control for the changing trends in the participation of (East African)
Table 3
Probability of Entering a Race (OLS)
Variables
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enter Enter Enter Enter
Expected oppositiont1 0.0271*** 0.0250*** 0.0162*** 0.0109***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Average prize (’00000) 0.3381*** 0.3404*** 0.3197*** 0.0212*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
1st/total 0.0259*** 0.0271*** 0.0108*** 0.0087***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Female 0.0013 0.0033 0.0032
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
At home 0.1163*** 0.1199*** 0.1222***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nationality: US 0.0070*** 0.0063*** 0.0065***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rankt1 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0312*** 0.0281*** 0.0009 0.0116**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Race fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 144,880 144,120 144,120 144,120
R2 0.015 0.036 0.041 0.059
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample is restricted to the
runners who were among the top 100 non-East African runners in the previous year. The sample period is 1986–
2009. ‘Expected oppositionðt1Þ’ is the fraction of East African runners among the top 20 finishers of the race in
theprevious year. ‘Averageprize’ is the sumof all prizes awarded in the race (USdollars at 2000prices)dividedby
thenumberof prizewinners. ‘1st/total’ is thewinner’s prize dividedby the sumof all prizes in the race. ‘Athome’
takes the value 1 if the runner is racing in his or her home country. ‘Nationality’ takes the value 1 if the runner is
fromtheUSand0otherwise. ‘Rank t1’ is the rankingof the runner in theprevious year (between1and100).The
time fixed-effects include a complete set of month and year dummies, as well as year and gender interactions.
33 Using past finishing times as a measure of expected opposition would not allow for such an instrument
and would add measurement error coming from factors such as weather conditions.
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runners in marathons. Column (4) includes race fixed-effects, which allows for race-
specific features that are attractive or unattractive to runners. Races tend to take place in
the same month each year. We also control for this, as a means to account for seasonal
effects. Overall, we find that an increase in expected opposition is associated with a
decrease in the entry of a high-ability contestant in a race and the average prize has a
positive effect on entry. The results allow us to determine the ‘prize’ that contestants are
willing topay for a reduction inopposition.Wefind that ahigh-ability runner’s likelihood
of participation is kept unchanged if a reduction in the (expected) number of opponents
by one is accompanied by a decrease in the race’s average prize by $2,583.34 This
constitutes almost 50% of a race’s average prize, calculated over all races. With respect to
prize concentration, overall, prize concentration has a positive effect on participation
once we control for time and race fixed-effects.
Table 4 shows that the results are robust to alternative definitions of high-ability and
expected opposition. First, we extend our definition of high-ability non-East African
Table 4
Probability of Entering a Race (Robustness)
Variables
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Enter Enter
Expected oppositiont1 0.0113*** 0.0136***
(0.004) (0.004)
Average prize (’00000) 0.0201* 0.0247**
(0.011) (0.012)
1st/total 0.0093*** 0.0081***
(0.002) (0.003)
Female 0.0028 0.0057***
(0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
At home 0.1204*** 0.1222***
(0.002) (0.002)
Nationality: US 0.0058*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002)
Rankt1 0.0000*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0156*** 0.0089**
(0.004) (0.004)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Race fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 168,530 144,120
R2 0.054 0.059
Notes. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In column (1) the sample is
extended to include the race choices of those runners who were among the top 100 non-East African runners
in any of the previous three years. In Column (2) the definition of ‘expected oppositiont1’ is narrowed to
include only those East African participants of the previous year’s race whose performance was within the
Top 100 finishing times of that year. All other variables are as described previously in Table 3.
34 A reduction in the number of East Africans by one is equivalent to a five percentage point decrease in
expected opposition since the determination of Ajt1 is based on the race’s top 20 finishers. Keeping the
likelihood of participation constant, therefore, requires a reduction in the race’s average prize by
100,000 9 0.05 9 0.0109/0.0211 = 2,583 dollars.
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
20 T H E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
runners to include those who finish in the top 100 during any of the last three years
rather than the previous year alone (column (1)). This accounts for the (rare)
possibility that during a particular year, a runner with top 100 potential may have failed
to finish a race within the top twenty. Second, we restrict our definition of expected
opposition by counting only those East African opponents whose finishing time was
amongst the top 100 finishing times of the (previous) year (column (2)). Using
performance in combination with the runners’ origin allows us to capture the
possibility that runners base their expectations about opposition on the speed with
which the race was run, while still allowing for a decomposition of runners into two
groups as outlined above.
In Table 5, we present the results with the interaction between opposition and
prize-concentration. Columns (1)–(4) show that there is a differential effect of prize
concentration on entry, depending on the expected level of opposition. In line with
the predictions of Proposition 1, we find that an increase in the prize structure’s
concentration is associated with an increase in entry if and only if the level of
opposition is below a certain threshold. In particular, we find that an increase in the
share awarded to the winner makes a race more attractive when expected opposition
(i.e. the proportion of East Africans among the race’s top twenty finishers in the
previous year) is below 44%.35 For higher levels of expected opposition, prize
concentration has a negative effect on the entry of high-ability runners. This finding
provides support for our assertion that, in contests, selection effect can be opposed to
incentive effects.
2.2.1. Exogenous variation in opposition
We have shown that participation is negatively related to expected opposition. An
important concern, however, is that the main variable of interest, Ajt1, might be
correlated with some unobservable characteristics, leading to a biased estimate of aA. If
a race becomes attractive to all high-ability runners, East African and non-East African,
for reasons unexplained by our set of observables, it will create a positive correlation
between the entry of these runners and the error term. This would translate into an
upward-biased estimate of aA. To deal with this issue, we instrument for expected
opposition, Ajt1, using exogenous variation in the entry of East African runners, that is
uncorrelated with the (unobservable) race characteristics. We do this by instrumenting
Ajt1 with rainfall, as well as commodity prices, in Kenya and Ethiopia in the previous
year, t  1, including all the second stage controls and time trends. We then construct
the interaction of the predicted Ajt1 with prize structure concentration. Both rainfall
and commodity prices are correlated with the number of East African runners who
compete in a given year but uncorrelated with race characteristics. It is unlikely that
these correlations will affect the race choice of non-East Africans, except through the
effect that they have on the level of expected opposition, Ajt1.
The reasoning behind the two instruments follows a growing literature, mainly in
political economy, which relates rainfall and commodity prices to economic conditions
in Sub-Saharan countries. It has been shown that rainfall levels positively affect income
35 To determine this threshold, we divide the concentration coefficient in column (4) by the interaction
term to get 0.0117/0.0264 = 0.44.
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per capita (Miguel et al., 2004) and the functioning of democratic institutions (Br€uckner
and Ciccone, 2011) in sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, Deaton (1999)
documents that commodity price downturns cause rapidly worsening economic condi-
tions in sub-Saharan African economies. Therefore, we expect rainfall and commodity
prices to have a positive effect on the international marathon participation of East
African runners. This is intuitive since most East African runners rely on the support
of sponsors, some of which are local businesses or regional government agencies.36
We construct international commodity price indices for Kenya and Ethiopia
following Deaton (1999) and Br€uckner and Ciccone (2011). For this purpose, we
use the International Monetary Fund monthly price data for exported commodities for
the period 1986–2009 and the countries’ export shares of these commodities taken
from Deaton for 1990. The rainfall data, covering the period 1986–2009, are taken
from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project. The first-stage estimates show
that rainfall and commodity prices are, indeed, strongly related to the participation of
East African runners in international marathons. In particular, with the exception of
commodity prices in Ethiopia, positive rainfall shocks and commodity price upturns,
increase the number of East African runners competing internationally. The
instruments are individually and jointly significant in the first stage (the F-Statistic of
their joint significance is 12.22). The first-stage regression is reported in Table 10.
In Table 5, columns (5) and (6), we present the results for the IV estimates,
including a time trend and year dummies, respectively. Since the predicted Ajt1 only
varies at an annual frequency, we cannot estimate the level effect of expected
opposition in column (6). We therefore focus on the interaction of the instrumented
expected opposition with prize structure concentration.
As in the OLS regressions, we find that the effect of concentration on entry depends
on the level of (expected) opposition. As opposition increases, prize concentration
becomes less attractive. The results are in line with those found using OLS; however,
the magnitudes are larger, suggesting that the coefficient on expected opposition is,
indeed, biased upwards when using OLS. Separating by gender (columns (7) and (8)),
the interaction between expected opposition and prize steepness is slightly stronger for
men but, overall, we observe a similar pattern.
2.3. Sorting
While Proposition 1 was concerned with the contestants’ individual preferences,
Proposition 2 focuses on the equilibrium distribution of players across contests. We now
move from the determinants of individual race choice to the analysis of the aggregate
distribution of runners across races, using the time-series variation of our dataset.
To test Proposition 2, we analyse whether an increase in the overall number of high-
ability contestants leads to a more balanced distribution of talent across contests. More
specifically, we test the following equation:
36 We might be concerned that in years when there are more (fewer) East African runners, the quality of
the marginal runner is lower (higher). We check this by looking at the finishing times of East African runners
in the years when there are many (few) and find that these times are not statistically different from one
another.
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SMt ¼ a0 þ aHAHAt þ aBBMt þ t þ et : (9)
The dependent variable, SMt , measures the level of sorting. It denotes the proportion of
East African runners who choose to participate in amajor rather than aminor marathon
in period t. For SMt ¼ 1, sorting is complete, i.e. East African runners participate
exclusively in major marathons. The main variable of interest, HAt , is the overall
proportion of East African runners, in period t. According to Proposition 2, sorting
should be decreasing in HAt . The variable BMt denotes the proportion of the total prize
money that is awarded in the major marathons. According to Proposition 2, sorting
should be increasing inBMt . We control for both time trends and for whether the year was
an Olympic year. Since marathons can be divided into spring and autumn races and
runners typically choose one from each group, we consider contest choice for a given
gender category, per season rather than per year to allow for a richer analysis.
Table 6 shows the estimates for (9). Since, in our theoretical model, the number of
high-type contests is identical to the number of low-type contests, we first restrict our
analysis (columns (1)–(4)) to the top ten races. These races include the five major
marathons, as well as the next five most important races (Hamburg, Honolulu,
Frankfurt, Paris and Rome). In columns (5)–(8), we consider the runners’ allocation
across all 35 races. The results are similar for both samples.
We find that an increase in the proportion of high-ability contestants leads to a
significant decrease in sorting. More specifically, as the proportion of East African
runners in the top ten races increases by 1%, the share of East Africans who choose a
major marathon decreases by 0.77% without controlling for time trends and 1.28%
when controlling for time trends. The effect is comparable, when all 35 races are
considered. These results constitute evidence for the decrease in sorting, as predicted
by Proposition 2. As expected, we also find evidence for a positive relation between
sorting and prize budget differences. In particular, a 1% increase in the proportion of
prize money awarded by the major races leads to an increase in the share of East
African runners entering a major race by 1.22% for the top ten races and by 0.49% for
all 35 races. It is reassuring that these effects persist when we control for time trends,
gender and differential trends across gender.
We see that in an Olympic year, the proportion of East African runners entering a
major marathon increases by 10%. This is intuitive since participation in the Olympics
is restricted by country quotas. Due to the large number of talented Kenyan and
Ethiopian runners, many of them are unable to run the Olympic marathon, whereas
runners of comparable ability but different nationality are able to participate with a
higher probability. As a result, the proportion of East African runners in the major
races, the next-best alternative to the Olympics, is higher in Olympic years.
To understand better the time series behaviour of the main variables of interest, in
Figure 2 we plot the relationship between sorting (SMt ) and the overall proportion of East
African runners (HAt) in each period. It seems that, while the proportion of East African
runners has been increasing over time, sorting has been decreasing. To ensure that our
results are not drivenby trends, wehave always included time trends in all our regressions.
In Figure 3, we plot the de-trended variables. From the Figure, we see that the deviations
from the trend of both variables also exhibit a negative relationship. This variation is the
one that identifies our main specification. Moreover, as robustness checks, we now also
© 2016 Royal Economic Society.
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estimate (9) with a quadratic and a cubic time trend function. In column (2) of Table 7,
we show that controlling for more flexible time trends the main results still hold.
To determine whether our results are identified by some time periods more than
others, in column (3) of Table 7, we interact the main variable of interest, the fraction
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Fig. 2. Sorting of High-ability Runners
Notes. Time-series plot of the overall proportion of high-ability runners (‘Proportion of HA
(origin)’) and the fraction who chose to participate in a major rather than a minor marathon
(‘sorting’).
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Fig. 3. Sorting of High-ability Runners (De-trended)
Notes. De-trended time-series plot of the overall proportion of high-ability runners (‘Proportion
of HA (origin)’) and the fraction who chose to participate in a major rather than a minor
marathon (‘sorting’). The variables are de-trended by linear trend.
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of high ability runners, with time dummies for time periods 1986–91, 1992–7, 1998–
2003, and 2004–9. The results show that the effect is identified across all periods,
except the first period, where, although the point estimate is highly negative, the
standard errors are quite large. Overall, our result that sorting depends negatively on
the fraction of high ability runners is consistent over time.
An alternative explanation for the decrease in sorting could be that organisers of
major marathons restrict the number of East African participants in order to
guarantee a diversified field. In order to rule this out, we check the robustness of
our results using an alternative proxy for talent. Rather than using origin, we
identify a group of high-ability runners in a given season using performances.37 We
Table 7
Sorting of High-ability Runners (Flexible Time Trends)
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Sorting Sorting Sorting
Proportion of HA (origin) 1.5077*** 1.2337***
(0.439) (0.449)
Proportion of HA 9 8691 1.2782
(1.497)
Proportion of HA 9 9297 1.2646**
(0.545)
Proportion of HA 9 9803 1.2311***
(0.425)
Proportion of HA 9 0409 1.0226**
(0.469)
Trend 0.0320** 0.1272** 0.0416
(0.014) (0.050) (0.106)
Trend square 0.0058* 0.0014
(0.003) (0.006)
Trend cube 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Proportion of prize 0.4907*** 0.5285*** 0.5247***
(0.130) (0.141) (0.138)
Female 0.0354 0.1574 0.1958
(0.108) (0.120) (0.159)
Trend 9 female 0.0105* 0.0025 0.0005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Olympic year 0.0548* 0.0530* 0.0391
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.0408 0.5 0.046
(0.165) (0.310) (0.648)
Observations 79 79 79
R2 0.445 0.49 0.516
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The Table shows sorting of
high ability runners (origin) across all 35 races. ‘Trend’ is a linear trend for the sample period 1986–2009.
‘Trend square’ and ‘trend cube’ are the trend squared and trend cubic, respectively. In column (3), the
proportion of high ability runners is interacted with dummy variables indicating time periods 1986–91, 1992–
7, 1998–2003, 2004–9. The regression considers sorting across all 35 races and definitions of all remaining
variables are as in Table 6.
37 Note that, since effort and ability are hard to separate, finishing times may be related to prize money. An
advantage of using origin is, therefore, that this definition of high-ability is independent of prize money
considerations.
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identify high-ability runners as those who have (adjusted) finishing times within 1%
of the season’s fastest finishing time in their gender category. We also look at those
finishing within 5% and 10% of the fastest time, respectively. It is likely that the
changes in the overall number of high-ability runners over the years are, at least in
part, a result of the increase in East African participation. However, this measure of
high ability is less restrictive, especially if the quality and composition of the group
of East African runners are changing over time.
Table 8 shows that our main results still hold when we repeat the analysis for the
alternative measure of ability based on rankings. The sorting of high-ability runners
into major races is increasing in the proportion of prize money on offer but decreasing
in the overall proportion of high-ability runners. Interestingly, the decrease is stronger
the more able the runners under consideration. In particular, a 10% increase in the
proportion of high-ability runners reduces sorting by 46%, 7%, or 3% when high-ability
refers to runners within 1%, 5%, or 10% of the fastest time, respectively. Thus, it seems
as if a contestant’s tendency to avoid competition by equally talented opponents is
increasing in his ability. Finally, note that in contrast to our estimation based on
runners’ origin, the Olympic year dummy is no longer significant, which is in line with
the reasoning provided above.
Table 8
Sorting of High-ability Runners (Performance)
Variables
Top 10 races All 35 races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting
Proportion of HA (1%) 2.0765*** 6.8256***
(0.637) (2.352)
Proportion of HA (5%) 0.4530** 0.8751***
(0.198) (0.267)
Proportion of HA (10%) 0.4092** 0.1771
(0.182) (0.132)
Proportion of prize 0.1374 0.1038 0.0522 0.2866 0.1669 0.0594
(0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.260) (0.148) (0.093)
Female 0.1268* 0.1773* 0.1797 0.2299 0.1084 0.0088
(0.076) (0.105) (0.128) (0.157) (0.113) (0.096)
Trend 0.0202*** 0.0331*** 0.0247*** 0.0124 0.0223** 0.0111*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007)
Trend 9 female 0.0094** 0.0121*** 0.0055 0.0094 0.0077 0.0018
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
Olympic year 0.0175 0.0407 0.0109 0.1283** 0.045 0.0111
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.061) (0.034) (0.021)
Constant 1.1969*** 1.3242*** 1.4504*** 0.4407 0.9276*** 0.5687**
(0.218) (0.279) (0.383) (0.364) (0.278) (0.260)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.312 0.494 0.356 0.207 0.376 0.39
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. High-ability runners are
defined as those with an (adjusted) finishing time within 1% (5%, 10%) of the race season’s fastest time in
their gender category. The dependent variable ‘sorting’ is the proportion of high-ability runners who enter a
major rather than a minor race. ‘Proportion of HA 1% (5%, 10%)’, is the overall proportion of high-ability
runners in the population of runners. Both variables are calculated separately for each race season (spring,
autumn). For definition of other variables, see Table 6.
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2.4. Robustness
In this subsection, we address four relevant concerns:
(i) the importance of prize money for a runner’s race choice;
(ii) the possibility of coordination;
(iii) the potential endogeneity of prize budgets; and
(iv) the identification of major races as high-type contests.
2.4.1. Do runners choose races based on prizes?
Based on runner-race characteristics (finishing times, prizes), how important are
(expected) prize winnings in a runner’s race choice? For example, a runner’s race choice
might be driven by other (unobservable) factors, such as sponsors’ preferences. This issue
is crucial for determining whether our empirical setting is appropriate to test our model.
As an illustration, we use the most recent year of our data to investigate a runner’s
potential prize winnings, taking the behaviour of all other runners as given. We then
construct the counterfactual outcome by counting the number of races in which the
runner could have obtained a higher prize than in the one he actually chose to
compete in. We take as given his current time (effort), as well as the times of all other
runners, thus neglecting potential effort adjustments.
Wefind that a surprisingly high fractionof runners choose a race thatmaximises their prize
winnings expost. Inparticular,around40%of theprizewinnerscouldnothaveearnedahigher
prize in any othermarathon. A further 20%had only one alternative race in which their prize
would have been higher. This suggests that (expected) prize winnings are an important
determinantof runners’ behaviour, relegatingother factors asmajordriversof contest choice.
2.4.2. Coordinated race choices
In some instances runners are managed by athlete representatives. This may lead to the
race choices of runners, who are managed by a common representative, to become
coordinated. Our theory (Proposition 3) shows that such coordination would have a
negative effect on sorting. Hence coordination may confound our result that sorting
depends negatively on the number of high-ability contestants but only if coordination
was easier to achieve in larger groups, which seems unlikely to be the case. In fact,
coordination is commonly seen as a small-group phenomenon due to the relative ease
to agree on a common decision. If anything, we, therefore, underestimate the actual
reduction in sorting implied by an increase in the number of high-ability contestants.
Moreover, with respect to marathon running, we expect the effect of coordination on
contest choices to be small. Using affiliation data by Road Race Management Inc. (2015),
we find that the number of runners who share a common manager is relatively low with
respect to the overall number of runners. Based on the information available for the 1,081
(male) East African runners that year, we find that more than half of the runners have no
manager. For those who are represented by a manager (46%), the Herfindhal
concentration index calculated for the distribution of runners across managers is only
0.04. This number increases only slightly to 0.10 when we restrict attention to the East
African runners included in the IAAF Top 100 List. In particular, those runners are
managed by 16 different representatives with at most nine runners sharing a common
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manager. Hence, while athlete representatives may have some influence on race choices,
the low level of runners’ concentration suggests that their effect is rather small.
2.4.3. Exogenous variation in prize budgets
Wemay be concerned that race organisers adjust their prizes to keep their race attractive to
high-ability contestants. If entry falls, race organisers may increase prize money. As a
consequence, the coefficient on Bjt in (8) would be biased downwards. We deal with this
problem by instrumenting the value of a race’s average prize with the exchange rate of the
country where the race takes place, relative to a currency basket.38 We expect that a move in
the exchange rate is associated with an exogenous change in the value of the race’s average
prize. This change should not be associated directly with race entry. In order to construct a
currency basket, we use the annual Special Drawing Rights basket provided by the
International Monetary Fund.39 Table 9 shows that when we instrument for the prize
Table 9
Probability of Entering a Race (Instrument for Prizes)
Variables
IV IV
(1) (2)
Enter Enter
Expected oppositiont1 0.0124*** 0.011
(0.004) (0.009)
Average prize (’00000) 0.3499** 0.3257**
(0.168) (0.160)
1st/total 0.0172 0.0048
(0.013) (0.009)
Expected oppositiont1 1st/total 0.0787***
(0.030)
Female 0.0061** 0.004
(0.003) (0.002)
Age 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
At home 0.1220*** 0.1218***
(0.002) (0.002)
Nationality: US 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Rankt1 0.0064*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.0047 0.0038
(0.012) (0.012)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Race fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 144,120 144,120
R2 0.053 0.055
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Average prize is instrumented
with the exchange rate of the country of the race relative to the Special Drawing Rights currency basket
provided by the IMF. For definition of variables, see Table 3.
38 This is preferable over instrumenting with the value of an East African runner’s national currency since
changes in the latter affect the attractiveness of all marathons equally.
39 This basket contains US Dollars, Euros, Japanese Yen and Pounds Sterling. Weights assigned to each
currency are adjusted annually to take account of changes in the share of each currency in world exports and
international reserves.
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budget, the coefficient is positive and significant, as previously seen. However, compared
with OLS, the coefficient is larger, even after controlling for race and year fixed effects,
suggesting that the OLS is, indeed, downward biased. The first stage of the instrument is
reported in Table 10.
2.4.4. Identification of high-type contests
In our analysis of sorting in subsection 2.3, we identify the major races as the high-type
contests, i.e. as those with high prizes and high concentration. We verify our
identification by repeating the participation analysis in subsection 2.2 through making
a distinction between entry into major and minor races. We define the variable major,
which takes the value 1 if the race is a major race and 0 otherwise, and we use it as an
alternative to the winner’s share to measure the prize structure’s concentration. We
find that our main results from subsection 2.2 hold. Being a major race increases entry,
but as opposition increases, major races become less attractive to enter. This provides
additional support for our identification of major races as high-type contests. The
results are presented in Table 11.
3. Conclusion
While the incentive effects of rewarding relative performance have been extensively
studied in the theoretical and empirical literature, little is known about contest
Table 10
First Stage Regressions
Variables
Expected
oppositiont1
(for Table 5)
Expected
oppositiont1
(for Table 10)
Average prize
(’00000)
(for Table 9)
Commodity price index in Kenyat1 0.0021*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log rainfall in Kenyat1 0.1833*** 0.0193***
(0.005) (0.005)
Commodity price index in Ethiopiat1 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log rainfall in Ethiopiat1 0.0115*** 0.0201***
(0.003) (0.003)
Exchange rate 0.0001***
(0.000)
Constant 0.6411*** 0.1305*** 0.0369**
(0.0184) (0.0165) (0.0039)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes
Race fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144,120 144,120 144,120
R2 0.49 0.61 0.743
Notes. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. ‘Commodity price index Kenya
(Ethiopia) in t  1’ is constructed using the international commodity price data from International
Monetary Fund. ‘Log rainfall in Kenya (Ethiopia) in t  1’ is annual rainfall data from the NASA Global
Precipitation Climatology Project. ‘Exchange rate’ is the exchange rate of the country of the race relative to
the Special Drawing Rights currency basket provided by the International Monetary Fund.
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selection. In this article, we present and test a simple model that studies both contest
and effort choices. Contestants take into account their own ability, the (expected)
strength of their competitors and the reward schemes offered by the different types of
contests. We show that contrary to common belief, the contests with the highest and
most-concentrated prizes do not always attract the largest number of high-ability
contestants. Contest selection depends, in a systematic way, on the overall distribution
of talent and sorting is reversed when the proportion of high-ability individuals
increases beyond a certain threshold. We show that the selection and incentive effects
of a contest’s prize structure can be either aligned or opposed depending on the
competitiveness of the environment, highlighting the importance to study both
effects.
Data limitations often prevent the empirical study of contest theory. Key model
parameters, such as individual ability and performance, are often unobservable.
Moreover, in many tournament settings, a wide array of factors confound the variables
of interest. In a labour-market setting, for example, it is often difficult to separate worker
from firm types. Our real-effort tournament setting overcomes such identification
problems and allows us to shed light on important aspects of contest design.Detaileddata
onmarathons andprofessional road runners, spanning three decades, provide uswith an
opportunity to test theoretical predictions on contest selection empirically.
Our empirical findings confirm our theoretical results and provide evidence for the
contestants’ trade-off between entering a contest with few high prizes or a contest with
many low prizes. Empirically, we have determined the ‘prize’ that contestants are
willing to pay to avoid talented opponents and that organisers must offer to guarantee
their contest’s attractiveness. Using exogenous variation in the level of competition,
our results provide evidence for a strong negative relation between the level of sorting
and the overall frequency of highly-talented contestants.
This article sheds light on an aspect of contest design that has been largely
overlooked. By focusing on the effect of contest design on participation, we have been
able to establish results, both theoretically and empirically, that complement those in
the existing literature. Since the basic trade-off between prizes and opposition, which
determines contest selection in our framework, is present in other settings, including
labour tournaments, procurement contests and R&D competition, we expect our
results to have important implications for contest design in a broad variety of contexts.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a contest with Mj prizes of size bj that has attracted NH high-ability
participants and N þ 1  NH low-ability participants. Index the N + 1 participants of the
contest in a way such that players n 2 f1; . . . ; NHg are of type H and players
n 2 fNH þ 1; . . . ; N þ 1g are of type L. Our model satisfies the definition of a (separable)
all-pay contest in Siegel (2009) with a player n’s valuation for winning given by vn ¼ bj  cne
where cn ¼ cH for n 2 f1; . . . ; NHg and cn ¼ cL for n 2 fNH þ 1; . . . ; N þ 1g.
In order to satisfy Siegel’s conditions for a generic contest, we now perturb the model by
assuming that player n’s (perturbed) valuation of winning is given by ~vn ¼ vn  n with
 2 ½0; bj=ðN þ 1Þ. This can be motivated by the existence of (small) differences in the players’
benefits from obtaining one of the contest’s prizes. Theorem 1 of Siegel (2009) then implies
that, in any equilibrium, the expected payoff of player n is given by:
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max
n
0; bj  n cn
cMjþ1
½bj  ðMj þ 1Þ
o
: (A.1)
Note that expected payoffs are zero for all players n 2 fMj þ 1; . . . ; N þ 1g. Also note that for
NH  Mj þ 1, all players n 2 f1; . . . ; Mj þ 1g have marginal cost cn ¼ cH , which implies that
the expected payoff of player n 2 f1; . . . ; Mjg is given by ðMj þ 1  nÞ. Finally, for
NH \Mj þ 1, it holds that cMjþ1 ¼ cL . In this case, the expected payoff of player
n 2 f1; . . . ; NH g is given by bj  n  ðcH=cLÞ½bj  ðMj þ 1Þ whereas the expected payoff of
player n 2 fNH þ 1; . . . ; Mjg is ðMj þ 1  nÞ. Taking the limit  ? 0 leads to the payoffs
described in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. To abbreviate notation in this and in most of the subsequent proofs, we
suppress the number of opponents N as an argument in the (cumulative) distribution functions
defined in (2) by letting f (k; p)  f (k; N, p) and F (k; p)  F(K; N, p).
It is immediate that EðUH Þ is increasing in bj and Mj , but decreasing in pj . To prove the last
claim of Proposition 1, increase the concentration of the contest’s prize structure by letting
~Mj\Mj and ~bj [ bj , and consider:
EðUH Þ  Eð ~UH Þ
1 c ¼ bjF ðMj  1; pjÞ 
~bjF ð ~Mj  1; pjÞ
¼ bj ½F ðMj  1; pjÞ  F ð ~Mj  1; pjÞ  ð~bj  bjÞF ð ~Mj  1; pjÞ:
(A.2)
The first term represents the advantage of the less-concentrated prize structure. When the
number of high-ability opponents turns out to be between ~Mj and Mj  1, the less-concentrated
prize structure guarantees a positive payoff, bj , whereas payoffs are zero for the more-
concentrated prize structure. The second term represents the advantage of the more-
concentrated prize structure. When the number of high-ability opponents is smaller or equal
to ~Mj  1, payoffs are positive for both prize structures, but the more-concentrated prize
structure offers an extra payoff ~bj  bj [ 0. Now EðUH Þ  ~EðUH Þ  0 is equivalent to:
bj
~bj  bj
 F ðMj  1; pjÞ
F ð ~Mj  1; pjÞ
 1
" #1
: (A.3)
We show below that the likelihood ratio f½F ðMj  1; pjÞ=½F ð ~Mj  1; pjÞg is strictly increasing in
pj , tends to infinity for pj ! 1; and converges to 1 for pj ! 0. Hence, there exists a pj 2 ð0; 1Þ
such that EðUH Þ  Eð ~UH Þ  0 if and only if pj [ pj . The more-concentrated prize structure
ð ~Mj ; ~bjÞ guarantees a higher payoff if and only if the likelihood pj with which opponents have
high ability is smaller than pj . The threshold pj is decreasing in Mj  ~Mj and increasing in ~bj=bj .
To complete the proof, consider:
@F ðK ; pÞ
@p
¼
XK
k¼0
N
k
 
½kpk1ð1 pÞNk  ðN  kÞpkð1 pÞNk1
¼ 1
pð1 pÞ
XK
k¼0
f ðk; pÞðk  NpÞ
¼ F ðK ; pÞ
pð1 pÞ ½EpðkjkK Þ  EpðkÞ\0:
(A.4)
Here EpðkÞ ¼ Np denotes the expected number of successes under the binomial distribution
f (k; p) and Epðk j k  K Þ is the expected number of successes conditional on this number being
smaller or equal to K. Using (A.4) we obtain for K [ ~K :
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@@p
F ðK ; pÞ
F ð ~K ; pÞ
" #
¼ F ðK ; pÞ
F ð ~K ; pÞ
Epðk j kK Þ  Epðk j k ~K Þ
pð1 pÞ [ 0: (A.5)
For p ? 0 it holds that F(K; p) ? 1 for all K implying that f½F ðK ; pÞ=½F ð ~K ; pÞg ! 1: Finally,
using l’Hopital’s theorem we obtain:
lim
p!1
F ðK ; pÞ
F ð ~K ; pÞ ¼ limp!1
@F ðK ; pÞ
@p
@F ð ~K ; pÞ
@p
¼ lim
p!1
ðN  K Þ N
K
 
ðN  ~K Þ N~K
  p
1 p
 K ~K
¼ 1; (A.6)
where we have used the representation of F in terms of the regularised incomplete beta function
F ðK ; pÞ ¼ ðN  K Þ N
K
 Z 1p
0
xNK1ð1 xÞKdx (A.7)
to get
@F ðK ; pÞ
@p
¼ ðN  K Þ N
K
 
ð1 pÞNK1pK : (A.8)
Proof of Proposition 2. The high-ability players’ preferences over contests are given by (4) with
ph ¼ 2yqH and pl ¼ 2yð1  qH Þ. It follows from (A.4) that:
dD
dqH
¼ 2y bh dF ðMh  1; phÞ
dph
þ bl dF ðMl  1; plÞ
dpl
 
\0: (A.9)
The higher the fraction of high-ability players who choose high-type contests, the less willing are
high-ability players to enter such contests. The fact that bh [ bl implies that:
DðqH ¼ 0Þ ¼ bh  bl F ðMl  1; 2yÞ[ 0: (A.10)
Hence, there cannot exist an equilibrium in which qH ¼ 0. Moreover,
DðqH ¼ 1Þ ¼ bhF ðMh  1; 2yÞ  bl : (A.11)
Note that DðqH ¼ 1Þ is strictly decreasing in y with DðqH ¼ 1Þ !  bl\ 0 for y ? 1/2 and
DðqH ¼ 1Þ ! bh  bl [ 0 for y ? 0. Hence, there exists a unique y 2 ð0; 1=2Þ such that
DðqH ¼ 1Þ  0 if and only if y  y. Therefore, an equilibrium in which qH ¼ 1 exists if and only
if y  y. Moreover, the equation DðqH Þ ¼ 0 has a solution qH 2 ð0; 1Þ if and only if y [ y. This
solution and, hence, the equilibrium are unique. To determine how qH depends on y for y [ y,
use (A.4) to get:
y
dD
dy
¼ bhph dF ðMh  1; phÞ
dph
 blpl dFðMl  1; pl Þ
dpl
(A.12)
¼ bhF ðMh  1; phÞ
1 ph ½Eph ðkjkMh  1Þ  Eph ðkÞ
 bl F ðMl  1; pl Þ
1 pl ½Epl ðkjkMl  1Þ  Epl ðkÞ:
(A.13)
For qH such that D = 0, we can substitute bh ¼ blf½F ðMl  1; plÞ=½F ðMh  1; phÞg to get:
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y dD
dy
bl F ðMl  1; pl Þ ¼
Eph ðk j kMh  1Þ  Eph ðkÞ
1 ph 
Epl ðk j kMl  1Þ  Epl ðkÞ
1 pl
\
Eph ðk j kMl  1Þ  Eph ðkÞ
1 ph 
Epl ðk j kMl  1Þ  Epl ðkÞ
1 pl
(A.14)
where the inequality follows from Mh\Ml . Note that:
@
@p
Epðk j kK Þ  EpðkÞ
1 p ¼
ð1 pÞ @Epðk j kK Þ
@p
þ Epðk j kK Þ  N
ð1 pÞ2  0; (A.15)
because Epðk j k  K Þ  EpðkÞ ¼ pN and:
@Epðk j kK Þ
@p
 @EpðkÞ
@p
¼ N
(see below).
In summary, since ph  pl , qH  1=2, we have thus shown that at any equilibrium such
that qH 2 ½1=2; 1Þ it holds that ðdD=dyÞjqH¼qH \ 0. Together with dD=dqH \ 0, this implies that
qH is strictly decreasing in y as long as q

H 2 ½1=2; 1Þ. This also means that once qH has crossed
1/2 from above, it will stay below 1/2 for all higher values of y. In other words, there exists
a y 2 ðy; 1=2 such that qH  1=2 for all y  y:
It remains to show that:
@Epðk j kK Þ
@p
 @EpðkÞ
@p
:
Following Jones (1990), let ~k be a so called weighted random variable with distribution function
~f ð~kÞ  ½~k=EpðkÞf ð~k; p; N Þ. Let ~F denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
Supressing p as an argument we can write:
Eðk j kK Þ ¼
XK
k¼0
kf ðk;N Þ
F ðK ;N Þ ¼
EðkÞ
F ðK ;N Þ
XK
k¼0
kf ðk;N Þ
EðkÞ ¼
EðkÞ
F ðK ;N Þ
~F ðK Þ; (A.16)
and the result follows if ½ ~F ðK Þ=F ðK ;N Þ is decreasing in p. Note that ~f ð0Þ ¼ 0 and that for ~k [ 0:
~f ð~kÞ ¼
~k
Np
N
~k
 
p
~kð1 pÞN~k ¼ N  1~k  1
 
p
~k1ð1 pÞN1ð~k1Þ: (A.17)
Hence ~F ðK Þ ¼ F ðK  1;N  1Þ and:
@
@p
~F ðK Þ
F ðK ;N Þ
 
¼ F ðK  1;N  1Þ
F ðK ;N Þ
EN1ðk j kK  1Þ  EN ðkjkK Þ þ p
pð1 pÞ ; (A.18)
where EN1 and EN denote expectations for binomial distributions f (k; p, N  1) and f (k; p, N)
respectively. To see that this term is negative, write k ¼ PNn¼1 xn with xn; n ¼ 1; . . .; N ; denoting
N independent Bernoulli trials with success probability p and note that:
EN ðkjkK Þ ¼ E
XN
n¼1
xn
XN
n¼1
xn K

[E
XN
n¼1
xn
XN1
n¼1
xn K  1 ^ xN  1

¼ E
XN1
n¼1
xn
XN1
n¼1
xn K  1

þ EðxN
xN  1Þ
¼ EN1ðkjkK  1Þ þ p:
(A.19)
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Here the inequality holds since
PN
n¼1 xn  K is the union of two disjoint events:
PN1
n¼1 xn ¼ K
and xN ¼ 0 or
PN1
n¼1 xn  K  1 and xN  1 with the former dominating the latter in terms of
the expected value of
PN
n¼1 xn :
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the concavity of the coordinator’s objective function:
@DC
@qH
¼ 2 @D
@qH
þ 2y bhph @
2F ðMh  1; phÞ
@p2
þ blpl @
2F ðMl  1; pl Þ
@p2
 
: (A.20)
Taking the derivative of (A.8) we get:
@2F ðK ; pÞ
@p2
¼ ðN  K Þ½ðN  1Þp  K  N
K
 
pK1ð1 pÞNK2: (A.21)
Substituting (A.8) and (A.21) into (A.8) and using ðN  M þ 1Þ N
M  1
 
¼ M N
M
 
we get:
@DC
@qH
2y
¼ bhMh½Nph Mh  ð1 phÞ
N
Mh
 
pMh1h ð1 phÞNMh1
þ blMl ½Npl Ml  ð1 pl Þ
N
Ml
 
pMl1l ð1 pl ÞNMl1:
(A.22)
If in both types of contests, the expected number of high-talent opponents is smaller than the
number of prizes, i.e. if Nph\Mh and Npl\Ml then ð@DC=@qH Þ\ 0. Since ph and pl are both
smaller than 2y and Mh\Ml , a sufficient condition for the above to holds is that 2yN \Mh or
y\ ðMh=2N Þ. This condition is sufficient for the manager’s objective function to be concave and
for a unique maximiser qCH to exist. In order to see how q
C
H compares to q

H , consider DC ðqH Þ.
Given concavity of the manager’s objective, it holds that qCH \ q

H , DC ðqH Þ\ 0. We have:
DC ðqH Þ ¼ 2yqH bh
@F ðMh  1; 2yqH Þ
@p
 2yð1 qH Þbl
@F ½Ml  1; 2yð1 qH Þ
@p
¼ y @D
@y

qH¼qH
:
(A.23)
In the proof of Proposition 2 it was shown that this term is negative for all qH  1=2.
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